The U.S. Military Intervention in Panama: Origins, Planning, and Crisis Management, June 1987-December 1989
Washington, D.C. Center of Military History, 2008. Paperback. Burgundy wraps with white lettering, bw illustrated front cover; xvi, 313 pp, bw and color illustrations, maps. VG (ex-library with labels and stamps on spine, block, inside front and rear covers and title page verso. Light shelfwear to wraps, number written on front cover near spine. Pages are otherwise clean.). Item #184659
ISBN: 9780160794193
From the Foreword: Prior to Operation Just Cause, the December 1989 U.S. intervention in Panama, American leaders had struggled for over two years with the increasingly difficult regime of General Manuel Antonio Noriega. At the time, the Panama Canal was still under U.S. administration, with the U.S. Southern Command based at Quarry Heights charged with its security. Led by General Frederick F. Woerner Jr. and supported by Maj. Gen. Bernard Loeffke, the command's Army component commander, American military leaders weathered a series of low-grade crises during 1988-1989, slowly culminating in a growing military confrontation with Noriega's military, paramilitary, and police forces. Detailed in Larry Yates' study are the contingency plans, rules of engagement, a host of varied operations-security patrols, guard duty, training exercise, shows of force, and police actions-and even the occasional firefight, all of which characterized this trying period. But this history is much more than a precursor to Just Cause. The book's true value lies in a careful examination of the complex relationships between a U.S. combatant command, one of the four American global military headquarters, and its Washington, D.C. superiors, to include Joint Chiefs Chairman Admiral William Crowe, Army Chief of Staff General Carl Vuono, Defense Secretary Richard Cheney, and Presidents Ronald W. Reagan and George H.W. Bush. Indeed, the able Woerner and his staff often found themselves walking a tightrope between a variety of ill-defined administration policies whose long-range goals were difficult to fathom and the exigencies of a steadily worsening local situation. The conflicting demands ultimately led to Woerner's untimely replacement by General Maxwell R. Thurman, an officer more comfortable with the Bush administration's approach to the crisis. Highlighted also are the roles played by the local joint and special operations headquarters, those U.S.-based commands charged with providing military reinforcements to the region, and those government officials responsible for regional diplomatic, intelligence, and economic affairs. The result is a rich mix of timeless experiences and insights especially attuned to the contingency fare so common in the post-Cold War era and an excellent primer for officers assuming duties in the joint defense commands and staffs that play a key role in today's defense establishment. The volume also marks another significant addition to the Center's expanding Contingency Operations Series. Contents include: Foreword -- Author -- Preface -- 1: Making Of A Crisis, June 1987-February 1988 -- United States and Panama -- Noriega -- Crisis in Panama -- Southern command and the crisis -- 2: Operation Orders And Security Enhancement, February-April 1988 -- Contingency planning: elaborate maze -- Sanctions -- Phase v Joint Special Operations Task Force, and US Army, south -- Security enhancement -- Showdown in Washington -- Joint task force-Panama -- 3: Violence, "Fissures," And A Prayer Book, April-May 1988 -- Noriega perseveres -- First blood -- Deja vu -- Prayer book -- Fissures -- 4: Settling In, May 1988-January 1989 -- Woerner's critique and policy proposals -- Joint training -- Stage -- Rules of engagement -- Redeployment question -- Enter the XVIII Airborne Corps -- 5: Toward A Tougher Posture, February-April 1989 -- Woerner's woes -- Terror in Panama -- Tougher posture -- 6: Operation Nimrod Dancer, May 1989 -- Muse affair -- Preelection preparations -- Election -- Deployments -- Adjusting and adapting -- Harbinger: invasion of Fort Espinar -- 7: Asserting US Treaty Rights, May-June 1989 -- Triad and fissures II -- Reasserting treaty rights: convoys -- Sliding into something -- 8: Ratcheting Up, June-September 1989 -- Blade jewel and the prayer book -- Woerner's "retirement" -- Ratcheting up -- Alice, Beatrice, and the others -- 9: From Black Tuesday To Blue Spoon, October-December 1989 -- General Max Thurman -- Black Tuesday: the 3 October coup attempt -- Ramifications -- Operation order 1-90 and operation plan 90-2 -- Road to just cause -- 10: Conclusions -- Twilight zone -- Joint operations -- Personalities -- Bibliography -- Abbreviations and acronyms -- Index.
OCLC: 232358210
Price: $36.00